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382 Abstract
This paper analyses bank intermediation in emerging market economies (EMEs) 
at the height of the 2008-09 global financial crisis. The analysis is based on cen-
tral bank responses to a BIS questionnaire prepared in July 2009, and thus pro-
vides a unique snapshot that can be used for studies of commercial banking activ-
ity in EMEs before and after the crisis. EME banks by and large adjusted to the 
crisis in ways that stabilised their financial positions. On the funding side, they 
reduced reliance on wholesale markets and sought to attract retail deposits. On 
the lending side, banks slowed new lending, shifted towards less risky loans and 
increased their holdings of government bonds. In an effort to boost liquidity, banks 
shortened the maturity of their assets, relied less on the interbank market and in-
creased the scope of their transactions with central banks. Foreign and domesti-
cally-owned banks adjusted to the crisis in similar ways.
Keywords: emerging market economies, global financial crisis, bank intermedia-
tion, bank business models, domestic- and foreign-owned banks
1 INTRODUCTION 
Emerging market economies were significantly affected by the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, compared with their experience in previous crises, 
EMEs generally displayed resilience. The peak period of stress in EME financial 
markets was also comparatively limited, with severe pressures in the aftermath of 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in mid-September 2008, and improved stability 
and signs of recovery starting in the third quarter of 2009. 
Around this time – more precisely in July 2009 – the Bank for International Set-
tlements (BIS) sent a comprehensive questionnaire to over 20 major EME central 
banks, asking them about the key aspects of domestic bank intermediation during 
the crisis: changes in bank business models (funding, lending, liquidity opera-
tions) and how foreign-owned banks’ responses compared with those of home-
owned banks. The analysis in this paper is based entirely on the responses to this 
questionnaire and subsequent discussions among Deputy Governors from EME 
central banks in January 2010. The paper thus provides a unique snapshot of EME 
commercial banking activity at the peak of the global financial crisis. As central 
banks provided their own preferred data series, no attempt was made to extend the 
analysis to the period after 2009. Rather, the purpose here is to provide a simple 
analytical insight into this rare crisis experience, which can then be used by re-
searchers studying banking in EMEs before and after the global financial crisis.2 
 The discussion refers to 21 EMEs from Asia (China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand); Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru); emerging Europe 
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Turkey); the Middle East (Israel, Saudi Arabia); and South Africa.
2 Country-specific experiences are discussed in Al-Hamidy (2010), Babicky (2010), Banai et al. (2010), Bank 
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383The main finding is that, despite the great variety of financial intermediation and 
bank ownership structures in EMEs, by and large, banks adjusted to the crisis as 
in a textbook scenario. On the funding side, they reduced their reliance on whole-
sale markets and increased their efforts to attract retail deposits. On the lending 
side, they reduced the growth of new loans to firms and households, shifted to-
wards less risky types of loans and increased their holdings of government bonds. 
On the liquidity side, banks shortened the maturity of their assets, relied less on 
the interbank market and started doing more business with central banks. 
Foreign and domestic banks broadly adjusted to the crisis in the same way. Ini-
tially, there were some differences in the speed of adjustment, but by end-2009 
both domestic and foreign banks moved in the same direction and adjusted their 
funding, lending and liquidity operations to a similar extent. The funding model 
seems to have mattered more for adjustment than bank ownership.
This paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 reviews the structure of finan-
cial intermediation in EMEs. Section 3 analyses the structure of bank funding 
before and during the 2008-09 crisis. Section 4 looks at changes in bank lending 
patterns. Section 5 evaluates domestic and foreign-owned bank responses at the 
peak of the crisis and discusses the incentives for establishing subsidiaries versus 
branches after the crisis. Section 6 concludes.
2 STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN EMEs 
To understand how banks in different EMEs reacted at the peak of the crisis, it is 
useful to start by analysing the structure of domestic financial intermediation. The 
relative importance of banks differs greatly both within and among emerging mar-
ket regions. This section looks at the relative size of banks, non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFIs), equity markets and bond markets in EMEs; the ownership 
structure of domestic banking systems; and the legal form of incorporation of 
foreign banks’ affiliates (i.e., subsidiaries vs. branches). Each of these elements is 
potentially relevant for explaining the observed trends in financial intermediation 
at the peak of the crisis. 
For instance, banks were generally more affected than NBFIs by the crisis so, 
other things being equal, one would expect countries with larger non-bank finan-
cial sectors to have experienced fewer disruptions in domestic financial interme-
diation. Similarly, one would expect countries with more developed domestic 
bond markets to have experienced less financial market upheaval than those rely-
ing mostly on international bond markets. 
Regarding the ownership structure, one view is that problems in international 
banks’ domestic markets (i.e., US, UK, German, French, etc. markets) inevitably 
led those banks to withdraw from EMEs. A classic example is the large-scale 
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384 When Japanese banks experienced problems in their domestic market as a result 
of declines in equity and real estate prices, they had to shrink their balance sheets 
to maintain their capital adequacy requirements. The resulting pullback provided 
a major impetus to the crisis that was unfolding in emerging Asia at the time. 
A competing view is that international banks consider some emerging markets of 
strategic importance for their overall business strategy. Therefore, it is in their 
vital interest to support operations in these markets during the crisis (de Haas and 
Lelyveld, 2004; EBRD, 2009). The case in point is banks from smaller western 
European countries (e.g., Austria, Belgium) that established a dense network of 
subsidiaries in central and eastern Europe (CEE). These subsidiaries generated the 
lion’s share of profits at the group level in the second half of the 2000s, and were 
therefore vitally important for the financial performance of parent banks. 
Yet another view is that in crisis periods lending by state-owned banks tends to be 
less procyclical than lending by foreign and private domestic banks. For instance, 
during the crises in emerging Asia and Latin America in the 990s, state-owned 
banks expanded credit faster (or cut credit to a smaller extent) than domestic and 
foreign-owned private banks (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). A similar experience 
was reported in some EMEs during the current crisis.
Finally, the legal form of incorporation of foreign banks’ affiliates may matter dur-
ing a crisis. Foreign bank affiliates are often of small importance from the parent 
banks’ perspective, but systemically important for the host country. One issue that 
arises in this context is how the host country authorities might deal with the loss 
of liquidity and disruptions in the domestic payment system if the parent institu-
tion decides to cut back support for such an affiliate. Other things being equal, one 
would expect the authorities in countries where foreign banks are present as sub-
sidiaries to be better equipped to preserve liquidity and stability, because subsidi-
aries are standalone entities with their own capital and are supervised by both host 
country supervisor and, on a consolidated basis, by the parent’s supervisory au-
thority. 
2.1 BANKS VERSUS OTHER FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
Banks in EMEs were much larger than NBFIs on the eve of the crisis and ac-
counted, on average, for 70-80% of total financial sector assets in 2007 (graph 1).3 
However, there were large differences across countries. In Latin America, for in-
stance, the share of banks in the combined assets of banks and NBFIs ranged from 
around 50% (Chile and Colombia) to 98% (Argentina), while in other EMEs it 
ranged from 65% (Israel, Korea, Malaysia) to 95% or higher (Hong Kong SAR, 
the Philippines, South Africa).
3 Unless otherwise noted, regional figures in the text, graphs and tables refer to simple averages of countries in 
a region. These are: China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
(emerging Asia); Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru (Latin America); the Czech Republic, 
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385The relative shares of banks and NBFIs remained stable through 2009. However, 
there were some exceptions: banks in India and Peru increased their share of total 
assets by 7 percentage points (pp) between 2006 and 2009; and in Hungary and 
Poland by 3-4 pp. Banks retreated compared to NBFIs on a larger scale only in 
Israel (by 5 pp), Colombia (3 pp) and Mexico (2 pp). 
Graph 1








Source: Central bank questionnaires.
Differences in the structure of financial intermediation were even larger when 
stock and bond markets are considered. At end-2007, when EMEs were still unaf-
fected by the crisis, stock market capitalisation was close to or higher than the 
local GDP in more than half of EMEs in our sample of 21 countries (table 1). 
Stock markets were also larger than the local banking system – in some cases 
two–three times so – in Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong SAR, India, Peru, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore and South Africa. Many countries, including Brazil, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and emerging Asian economies, also had fairly large local 
bond markets, ranging in size from 50% to over 100% of local GDP. Overall, 
countries in emerging Asia stood out in terms of the size and diversity of their fi-
nancial systems, followed by Israel, Chile, South Africa, Brazil, central European 
countries and Saudi Arabia (table 1). 
These data suggest that many EMEs were not quite “emerging” in terms of the 
size and diversity of their financial sectors. Although the crisis had a huge impact 
on stock markets in many EMEs – equity prices fell by 20-40% between end-2007 
and end-2009 – other segments of EMEs’ financial sectors were unaffected or else 
expanded. 
The data in table 1 also show that the financial sectors of the majority of EMEs 
could not be characterised as bank-centred: NBFIs, equity and bond markets 
matched or exceeded the size of the local banking sector in many countries. A 
comprehensive assessment of the impact of the crisis on financial intermediation 
in EMEs would therefore need to go beyond the narrow banking sector, on which 
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386 Table 1












Singapore 656 08 308 58 ,3
Hong Kong SAR 64 38 800 25 ,504
China 20 – – 50 260
Malaysia 206 0 26 85 427
Korea 60 94 98 03 455
Thailand 3 47 79 57 33
India 83 62 57 42 345
Latin America
Chile 02 98 3 26 357
Brazil 0 23 95 7 290
Mexico 44 9 39 34 35
Argentina 36  22 29 88
Peru 33 32 97 2
Central and eastern Europe 
Hungary 08 24 80 56 267
Czech Republic 06 37 27 60 230
Poland 7 36 92 38 236
Turkey 69 0 40 34 53
Other EMEs
Israel 48 2 0 34 404
South Africa 27 6 50 43 327
Saudi Arabia 75 – 35 – 20
Source: Central bank questionnaires.
2.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF BANKS
EMEs differed considerably in terms of the ownership structure of their banks. 
Banking systems in Asia had, on average, a fairly balanced ownership structure 
(graph 2). Compared to other emerging market regions, Asia also stood out in 
terms of the relative importance of state-owned banks and other banking institu-
tions (cooperative banks, credit unions, etc.). However, this was mainly due to the 
large size of the state and cooperative sectors in China and India. In Latin Ame-
rica, foreign and private domestic banks each accounted for about 40% of banking 
system assets, and state-owned banks for the remaining 20%. In CEE, foreign-
owned banks dominated, accounting for over 60% of total banking system assets 
on average, and often much more in individual countries. In other EMEs – Israel, 
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387ing for 80% of total assets, with the remainder split between foreign and state-
owned banks. 
Graph 2



















Source: Central bank questionnaires.
Again, regional averages masked considerable country differences. With the ex-
ception of the Czech Republic and Saudi Arabia, where foreign and private domes-
tic banks accounted for, respectively, 96% and 98% of total banking system assets, 
different forms of ownership were well represented in almost all EMEs. For in-
stance, private domestic banks accounted for more than 50% of total assets in 
Brazil, Colombia, Israel, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand 
and Turkey, and foreign-owned banks accounted for more than 50% of total assets 
in Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Poland and Singapore (appendix 
graph A1). State-owned banks had a strong presence (more than 30% of total as-
sets) in Argentina, Brazil, China, India and Korea. The ownership structure of 
banks in EMEs remained fairly stable through 2009. This contrasts with develop-
ments in earlier financial crises affecting EMEs, when major changes were taking 
place in the structure of the banking industry (see Mihaljek, 2006; Turner, 2008). 
Regarding the legal form of foreign banks’ presence in EMEs, subsidiaries were 
dominant in Latin America and CEE, while branches accounted for about two 
thirds of foreign banks’ assets in Asia and other EMEs (graph 3). In Colombia, 
Malaysia, Mexico and Peru, foreign banks operate only as subsidiaries, while in 
China, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa they operate only as branches. Unlike 
the overall ownership structure, the legal form of foreign banks’ operations has 
changed in several EMEs: from 2006 to 2009, the relative share of branches in-
creased by 15 pp in Korea, 8 pp in Hungary, 4 pp in Israel and 3 pp in Poland. But 
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388 Graph 3













Source: Central bank questionnaires.
3 BANK FUNDING 
In the run-up to the 2008-09 crisis, the funding of banks in EMEs was character-
ised by two main trends: first, domestic deposits were generally growing more 
slowly than bank lending, resulting in rising loan to deposit ratios; and second, 
banks in EMEs were increasingly relying on foreign sources in order to fund the 
rapid expansion of credit. These trends were particularly pronounced in CEE, 
parts of Latin America, South Africa and Korea.
With the onset of the crisis in October 2008, both domestic and foreign sources of 
bank funding in EMEs largely evaporated. Growth rates of domestic funding 
plunged from 15-25% year-on-year in 2007-08, to 0-7% in 2009 (graph 4, left-
hand panel). The retrenchment in foreign funding was even more dramatic, espe-
cially in Latin America and CEE (right-hand panel). The banking systems in virtu-
ally all EMEs recorded negative growth of foreign funding for the full year 
2009.
Among domestic sources of funding – borrowing from other domestic financial 
institutions and bonds and money market instruments issued by banks in domestic 
markets – both deposit growth and market-based funding slowed sharply in 2009 
(graph 5). This is not surprising in view of the severity of the real and financial 
shocks that hit the EMEs in the first half of 2009: the collapse in exports depressed 
the growth of customer deposits (left-hand panel), while disruptions in local inter-
bank and securities markets led to the sharp fall in domestic market funding (right-
hand panel). During the second half of 2009, as global and local financial markets 
gradually recovered, banks in several Asian countries, including China, India, the 
Philippines and Thailand, started again to issue securities in domestic markets, 
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In relative terms, the shock to deposits was generally stronger than that to domes-
tic funding. As indicated in graph 6, the share of deposits in domestic liabilities 
decreased in all emerging market regions with the exception of Asia, while the 
share of domestic money and bond market funding was slightly higher in three out 
of four regions in 2009 than in 2006.
The situation with foreign funding was similar. Short-term liabilities plunged 
everywhere in 2009, recording average growth rates from -10% to -40% year-on-
year (graph 7, left-hand panel). Long-term liabilities dropped precipitously in 
CEE, where banks had for years relied on longer-term funding provided by inter-
national banks, and in Latin America, especially Brazil and Chile (right-hand 
panel). Long-term liabilities increased modestly only in emerging Asia. These 
developments reflected disruptions in global money markets on the one hand, and 
a temporary halt in cross-border credit flows to EMEs on the other. 
Graph 4
Funding of emerging market banks, year-on-year growth rates, in per cent
Source: Central bank questionnaires.
Graph 5
Domestic funding, year-on-year growth rates, in per cent


























































38 (4) 381-404 (2014)
390
Disturbances in the international money and bond markets seem to have had a 
bigger impact on the composition of foreign funding than disruptions in cross-
border bank flows. As indicated in graph 8, with the exception of Colombia, Mex-
ico and Peru, the share of cross-border bank funding in total foreign liabilities was 
still higher in 2009 than in 2006, while the share of international money market 
instruments and bonds issued by EME banks was generally lower (Peru was a 
notable exception in bond issuance). The funding of EME banks by other foreign 
financial institutions – as well as from other foreign sources – was lower as a per-
centage of foreign liabilities in almost all the countries in 2009 compared with 
2006.
Graph 6
Composition of domestic funding, as a percentage of domestic liabilities

















Domestic market fundingTotal deposits
Graph 7
Foreign funding, year-on-year growth rates, in per cent (both left- and right-hand 
sides)
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39
Central banks clearly identified problems in domestic and foreign funding in their 
contributions to the BIS meeting of Deputy Governors of emerging market econo-
mies. For instance, Brazilian banks often turn to international banks for credit 
lines for exporters. Their access to export credit lines was significantly restrained 
for some time during the crisis, prompting the central bank to provide a trade 
credit facility to banks until the access to foreign sources of credit gradually re-
sumed. 
In Mexico, some smaller- and medium-sized banks launched aggressive cam-
paigns to increase funding from retail depositors by offering very attractive inter-
est rates, while others expanded their branch networks. Some Mexican banks also 
increased the proportion of liabilities held as liquid assets, while others called 
back some assets and reduced their lending commitments as a temporary measure 
to get through the crisis. Competition for deposits also strengthened in Hong Kong 
SAR, Korea and Hungary. In Poland, banks replaced maturing domestic interbank 
exposures with borrowing from foreign banks (mainly parent companies), and 
made efforts to raise more stable domestic sources such as deposits from non-fi-
nancial clients (mainly households). This was, however, accompanied by a “de-
posit price war” that negatively affected banks’ financing costs and increased 
pressure on their interest margins.
Despite evidence of funding pressures in a large number of EMEs, many central 
banks felt that the financial crisis had no major impact on the funding strategies of 
banks operating in their domestic market. The main reason for this was that many 
emerging market banks did not rely extensively on either domestic or foreign 
market funding – they generally had a sufficient pool of local deposits to fund 
Graph 8
Composition of foreign funding, as a percentage of foreign liabilities
Note: BK = cross-border loans provided by foreign banks; FI = loans provided by other foreign 
financial institutions; MM = international money market instruments issued by emerging mar-
ket banks; IB = international bonds issued by emerging market banks; OT = other sources of 
foreign funding.
Source: Central bank questionnaires.
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392 loans to their clients. As shown in graph 9, roughly two thirds of EMEs in our 
sample had loan-to-deposit ratios below 100% in 2009, despite a widespread in-
crease in these ratios since 2006. Another reason was that local interbank markets 
by and large continued to function normally through the crisis – although, admit-
tedly, these markets were not as important a source of liquidity as in advanced 
economies. 
Graph 9




101 96 95 91 88













1 Total loans as a percentage of total deposits. For Singapore, domestic banks only.
Sources: Central bank questionnaires; BIS calculations.
Another source of funding – the securitisation of bank loans – was also affected 
by the crisis. In most EMEs, securitisation was not widespread, but plans for its 
development were well-advanced in some countries prior to the crisis. In India, 
securitisation was mostly based on retail loans and was not too complex. With the 
crisis, securitisation decreased in volume, but was expected to resume in the fu-
ture. In China, there were several pilot programmes for the securitisation of bank 
loans. However, with loan-to-deposit ratios of around 60%, the motivation for 
securitisation was relatively low. The central bank nevertheless promoted the de-
velopment of a legal infrastructure and regulatory framework for securitisation 
because of concerns that banks might start moving riskier loans off their balance 
sheets by selling them to trust companies; these had already been in trouble sev-
eral times in the previous decade because of investments that were too risky. In 
Saudi Arabia, the authorities were approached by the banking industry on the is-
sue of securitisation prior to the crisis. However, with bank loans already growing 
at annual rates of more than 25%, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority decided 
that it was not in the interest of financial stability to provide a further boost to 
credit growth by developing a framework for securitisation. By contrast, the au-
thorities in South Africa gave a push to securitisation by lowering the loan-to-
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3934 BANK LENDING 
Before the crisis spread from advanced to emerging market economies in October 
2008, private sector credit had expanded rapidly in most EMEs. The expansion 
was particularly pronounced in CEE, Brazil, Chile, Korea and South Africa. Cre-
dit stagnated or decreased as a percentage of GDP only in a few Asian and Latin 
American economies (graph 10).
The great credit expansion resulted from a combination of cyclical, structural and 
policy factors that were in place from 2002 onwards. Low real interest rates and 
the strong growth of the global economy were the key cyclical factors. Rapid fi-
nancial sector development and growing economic and financial integration of 
EMEs with advanced economies were the major structural forces. More disci-
plined macroeconomic policies and greater emphasis on financial stability in 
EMEs were also contributing elements. Together, these factors provided incen-
tives for portfolio diversification by global investors and led to a surge in capital 
flows to EMEs, which funded much of the credit expansion (Mihaljek, 2009). In 
addition, the balance sheets of commercial banks in some EMEs with fixed ex-
change rates expanded as a result of prolonged foreign exchange intervention by 
central banks resisting currency appreciation.
Graph 10
Domestic bank credit to the private sector, end-2002 to August 2008, cumulative 























Following the onset of the crisis in the main financial centres in August 2007, the 
growth of total bank assets and loans began to slow down in most EMEs (graph 
11). As the crisis spread in October 2008, credit growth decelerated sharply. Apart 
from some Asian and Latin American countries, most EMEs recorded negative 
credit growth rates in 2009. It is striking, for instance, how similar the average rate 
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394 Graph 11


















Source: Central bank questionnaires.
Corporate credit growth decelerated sharply in all emerging market regions in 
2009 (graph 12, centre panel). The slowdown in household lending was pro-
nounced in CEE and Latin America, and more moderate in Asia and other EMEs 
(left-hand panel). Lending to the public sector increased in CEE, and in particular 
in Latin America, while in Asia and other EMEs, public sector lending decreased 
(right-hand panel).
Graph 12


















Source: Central bank questionnaires.
In terms of the currency composition of loans, foreign currency loans decreased 
much faster than domestic currency loans in 2009 (graph 13). While the rates of 
decrease across regions were quite similar in 2009, it is interesting to note that 
foreign currency lending in CEE increased during 2008, despite the ongoing crisis 
Total loansTotal assets
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395in many western European countries, where most banks operating in CEE have 
headquarters. As a result, foreign currency loans accounted for about 35% of total 
outstanding domestic bank credit in CEE in 2009, compared with 15-18% in other 
emerging market regions. This was a major source of vulnerability during the 
crisis, especially since a quarter of foreign currency loans were taken by house-
holds, which in most cases do not have foreign currency income and cannot hedge 
exchange rate risk due to the lack of hedging instruments. One should note, how-
ever, that foreign currency lending was more a question of banking product devel-
opment than a problem of currency substitution induced by macroeconomic insta-
bility, although some macroeconomic developments did play a role in the spread 
of foreign currency lending, including fiscal deficits in Hungary, which kept do-
mestic interest rates high.
Graph 13














Source: Central bank questionnaires.
There were also some significant changes in the composition of bank assets other 
than loans. Holdings of long-term securities fell sharply in CEE and Latin Amer-
ica, and increased in Asia and other EMEs in 2009 (appendix graph A2, left-hand 
panel). In CEE, the reduction in long-term bond holdings was limited to domestic 
corporate and government bonds, while foreign bond holdings increased sharply 
(appendix graph A3). Banks in Asia and other EMEs also increased their foreign 
bond holdings in 2009. In addition, banks in most EMEs increased their holdings 
of short-term securities (appendix graph A2, right-hand panel).
Central bank contributions to the meeting of EME Deputy Governors provided 
further detail on these developments. In Hungary, India, Korea, Singapore, South 
Africa, Thailand and Turkey, credit growth slowed sharply as credit demand fell 
and banks tightened their credit standards and price and non-price credit terms. In 
Argentina and the Philippines, the composition of domestic credit shifted from the 
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396 Africa, in contrast, corporate lending decreased more than loans to households 
due to a sharp contraction in output. China was an important exception: the growth 
rate of total loans doubled in 2009 to 30% year-on-year by end-October.
Banks in several countries (including Brazil, the Czech Republic and South Afr-
ica) shortened the maturity of lending and often voluntarily increased their hold-
ings of statutory liquid assets. This was also the case with commercial banks in 
India and Turkey, which significantly increased their holdings of government se-
curities. In Korea, banks expanded their short-term placements in money market 
funds. 
In Poland, there was a significant disruption of the domestic interbank deposit 
market. In response, banks limited the growth of credit to the economy (espe-
cially the non-financial corporate sector), raised the share of highly marketable 
treasury securities in their assets, and increased holdings of central bank bills and 
deposits at the central bank.
5 DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN-OWNED BANKS 
Reflecting the diversity of ownership forms and market positions of banks in 
EMEs, the responses of domestic and foreign-owned banks to the crisis have been 
quite varied and cannot be easily categorised. 
A number of central banks in countries with both low and high shares of foreign 
bank ownership (e.g., Brazil, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore and Thailand) reported that there were no major differences in the reac-
tions of domestic and foreign-owned banks during the crisis. For instance, South 
Africa’s largest foreign-owned bank (which is the second largest bank in the coun-
try) responded to the crisis like the domestic banks. In Thailand, both foreign and 
local banks became more cautious in lending to risky businesses (especially small- 
and medium-sized enterprises, which was also the case in Korea); and reduced 
their off-balance sheet transactions, especially in foreign currency derivatives. 
The main difference was that foreign-owned banks reduced household loans and 
increased secured lending slightly, while the Thai banks increased household 
loans and kept secured lending unchanged. 
Similarly, in Hong Kong SAR, both local and overseas banks cut back loans to the 
corporate and household sectors sharply after the onset of the crisis. One differ-
ence was that locally incorporated banks were more aggressive in securing stable 
funding in the retail market by offering more attractive time deposit rates. In Sin-
gapore, some foreign banks cut back lending to non-core customers and complex 
trading activities as part of restructuring measures undertaken by parent banks 
worldwide. Overall, however, these cutbacks were not significant. In Saudi Ara-
bia, liquidity from head offices decreased temporarily for some foreign bank 
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397various sectors in the economy. Nevertheless, one foreign bank branch was able to 
issue an Islamic bond (sukuk) to fund its Saudi assets during the crisis. 
Among the countries with a moderate share of foreign-owned banks (i.e., 15-30% 
of total banking sector assets), foreign-owned banks generally reduced domestic 
credit faster than private domestic banks, for instance in Argentina, Turkey, and 
among smaller foreign banks in South Africa. Similarly, foreign-owned banks in 
Colombia were quite procyclical in consumer lending. In Argentina and Turkey, 
the decline in credit by the private banks – both foreign and domestic – was partly 
offset by increased lending by the state-owned banks. 
The funding responses of private domestic banks and foreign-owned banks also 
differed in some countries. In Turkey, for instance, foreign-owned banks reduced 
interbank borrowing much more than private domestic banks (this was also the 
case in the Philippines), and issued subordinated debt to offset the decline in 
cross-border loans. Foreign-owned banks also significantly increased the amount 
of funds raised from repo transactions, while the private domestic banks reduced 
their funding through repos. 
It is interesting to note that reactions to the crisis differed even among some for-
eign-owned banks. In South Africa, smaller foreign-owned banks whose parents 
were more exposed to the global financial turmoil were cut off from head office 
funding and had to reduce their exposures to the corporate sector. If the news 
about their foreign owners was bad, they tried to emphasise how they were de-
linked and independent; if the news was good, they stressed the willingness of 
their parents to stand by them. 
Among the countries where foreign-owned banks play a key role in domestic fi-
nancial intermediation, the question of domestic versus foreign-owned banks was 
less relevant than the question whether foreign banks helped to maintain financial 
stability through the crisis. On this issue, experiences varied. In Mexico, some 
subsidiaries – especially those whose parents were in trouble – initially reduced 
credit faster than other banks, although later on, domestic banks also cut back 
their lending. Many foreign-owned banks in Mexico ended up lending to parent 
banks.4 Some parent banks also transferred loans to large Mexican firms from the 
books of the head office to the books of the subsidiaries in order to reduce the head 
office leverage. Foreign bank subsidiaries also reduced their risk positions and 
trading activity in the foreign exchange and sovereign debt markets. 
In contrast to the situation in Mexico, in Hungary parent banks fulfilled their sup-
port function during the crisis, showing no signs of withdrawing funds from their 
subsidiaries. In addition to stabilising the position of subsidiaries, parent banks 
4 This was also the case in some central European countries – in particular the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
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398 provided them with foreign currency funding and increased the role of intragroup 
foreign currency swaps. On the other hand, domestically owned banks received 
government loans to strengthen their liquidity position during the crisis, and the 
central bank provided foreign currency liquidity under its swap facility. Both local 
and foreign-owned banks reduced their profit targets for 2009, started competing 
for deposits, and cut back loans to risky industries such as construction.
The experience of Poland was somewhere between these extremes. Foreign-
owned banks generally reduced corporate credit and expanded household credit 
faster than Polish-owned banks. They kept on providing foreign currency loans 
(though at a much diminished rate), while Polish-owned banks largely stopped 
providing such loans, replacing them with local currency loans. Foreign-owned 
banks also closed their liquidity funding gap faster than domestically owned 
banks. In particular, at the height of the crisis in Q4 2008, foreign-owned banks 
withdrew earlier than domestic banks from the interbank market, preferring to 
deal with the central bank rather than with other commercial banks. This lack of 
confidence was “imported” from the outside: parent banks apparently instructed 
their Polish subsidiaries to withdraw from the local interbank market. But, on the 
whole, parent banks did not abandon their subsidiaries in Poland or elsewhere in 
CEE during the crisis. They broadly maintained their cross-border credit lines and 
lending in domestic currency, thus acting as a stabilising force during the crisis 
and demonstrating that these markets were of strategic importance to them (see 
Mihaljek, 2010). 
A related issue is whether parent banks will convert some of their emerging mar-
ket subsidiaries into branches after the crisis. Over the past decade, centralisation 
of the decision-making process in global financial institutions has led to a system 
in which subsidiaries operate more or less like branches. In the European Union, 
this development has been facilitated by the adoption of the single EU banking 
passport. 
Branch banking was often attractive to host country authorities in the past because 
it seemed to provide greater incentives to foreign banks to transfer know-how and 
technology to EMEs. With the crisis, however, the focus of host country authori-
ties has shifted towards financial stability issues. This has made subsidiaries more 
attractive for some host countries because of the possibility of ring-fencing their 
assets and of regulating them more tightly than branches. In response, some for-
eign banks considered at the time the possibility of turning their subsidiaries into 
branches if the local regulation of subsidiaries’ activities increased significantly 
after the crisis.
However, there has also been a movement away from foreign bank branches in 
some countries. In China, the authorities expressed an interest in expanding the 
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399to subsidiaries in the future. One reason for this was the high concentration of 
some activities in foreign bank branches: with just 2% of total banking system 
assets, foreign bank branches accounted for 50% of derivatives and 18% of for-
eign currency trading before the crisis. Another was the desire to encourage for-
eign-owned banks to lend and fund their activities in China in the future. Malaysia 
had some positive experience with this approach – by requiring foreign banks to 
operate as subsidiaries, the authorities ensured that banks had a level playing field 
and entered the crisis with sufficient capital. By contrast, the authorities in India 
were reluctant to grant foreign banks the full national treatment given to domestic 
banks, out of concern that foreign banks could come to dominate some market 
segments. 
In summary, in many EMEs where foreign-owned banks do not play a key role in 
domestic financial intermediation, the differences in the reactions of local and 
foreign-owned banks at the peak of the crisis were small and discernible mainly in 
the details of their funding and lending operations. In particular, there were no 
noticeable changes in the composition of the loan portfolios of the two groups of 
banks at the peak of the crisis. In EMEs where foreign banks played a somewhat 
bigger role they generally adjusted their balance sheets faster and more deeply 
than domestic banks. Finally, in EMEs where foreign-owned banks were the dom-
inant financial intermediaries, reactions to the crisis depended on the exposure of 
parent institutions, the financial health of subsidiaries, and the strategic impor-
tance of subsidiaries for parent banks. In the end, financial stability was preserved 
both in those EMEs where parent banks fulfilled their support function and in 
those where they withdrew funds from subsidiaries. However, the latter often re-
quired some extraordinary efforts on the part of central banks to stabilise the local 
financial markets.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper analysed a unique data set on the behaviour of EME banks at the peak 
of the crisis in 2008-09. The data were provided by 21 emerging market central 
banks to the BIS in late 2009, and as such represent a useful benchmark for studies 
of EME banking activity before and after the global financial crisis. 
At the height of the crisis, EME banks clearly sought to stabilise their financial 
position: on the funding side, they borrowed less in wholesale markets and started 
attracting retail deposits; on the lending side, they reduced new loans to firms and 
households, shifted towards less risky loans, and increased their holdings of gov-
ernment bonds. In an effort to boost liquidity, banks shortened the maturity of 
their assets, relied less on the interbank market and increased the scope of their 
transactions with central banks. The differences in the reactions of local and for-
eign-owned banks at the peak of the crisis were generally small and depended on 
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400 Subsequent developments have shown that the sharp decline in credit growth bot-
tomed out in most major EMEs during 200. Owing to resilient economies and 
strong domestic demand, the rebound in banking activity in emerging Asia and 
Latin America was quite pronounced through mid-2012. In emerging Europe, the 
rebound was more subdued in this period (with the exception of Turkey), reflect-
ing spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. Since mid-2012, 
credit growth has slowed in emerging Asia and Latin America, as central banks 
took measures to address the signs of overheating. Within a relatively short period 
of four to five years, banking activity in EMEs has thus experienced a full cycle 
– from the peak in 2007-08, to the trough in the first half of 2009, to another peak 
in mid-2012 – demonstrating considerable resilience and stability along the way. 
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Graph a1
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402 Graph a2
Holdings of securities by banks in emerging markets, year-on-year growth rates, 



























Source: Central bank questionnaires.
Graph a3
Holdings of long-term securities by banks in emerging markets, year-on-year 
growth rates, in per cent (both left- and right-hand sides)
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